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THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF
ROSCOE POUND*
LINUS J. MCMANAMAN, O.S.B.t
A MONG AMERICAN jurists, as well as among those of the
rest of the world, there is a noticeable interest in natural law.
Many are calling for some ultimate principles of law to halt the onward
march of pragmatism and its natural offspring, legal realism. But,
unhappily, they are not looking for a natural law in the traditional
Thomistic sense, a natural law that is binding even in the absence
of all positive disposition. Rather they are seeking an ideal picture
of law to serve as a norm for the elaboration of positive law.
Roscoe Pound is an example of those who see philosophy and
natural law only as something to fill lacunae in the positive law,
or to serve as post factum critique of the established law. 'The
traditional meaning of natural law has been lost, and scholastic
philosophers are not without fault. Too often natural law has been
rejected by jurists outside of Thomistic schools because it has not
been properly presented. There is a task for scholastics of guarding
against being deserving of the criticism directed at the contemporary
received natural law, and of entering into the arena with our con-
temporaries to confront them with the true natural-law tradition.
It is beyond the scope of this article to present a complete survey
of Thomistic natural law. But in reviewing the legal theory of Roscoe
Pound we may see where scholasticism may become an effective force.
Pound and his Problems
It was August 29, 1906, at the Capitol Building, St. Paul,
Minnesota, the twenty-ninth Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association. A young, hitherto unheralded, jurist and professor
*This article is a portion of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of
Fribourg, Switzerland.
t Professor of Natural Philosophy and Ethics, St. Benedict's College.
ROSCOE POUND
from the University of Nebraska shocked
the assembled jurists into attention and
divided the group into two camps with a
paper entitled, The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction With the Administration
of Justice.' It was in this way that
Roscoe Pound launched the most brilliant
career in American jurisprudence, or per-
haps, in all contemporary jurisprudence.
In the assembly at this meeting there
was on the one side the "old guard" who
felt that there was no popular dissatisfac-
tion, or, granting that there may have
been a little, they claimed that it was
without reason. On the other side was
the avant garde who lined up with Pound
in a demand for better laws, for better
and more effective administration of jus-
tice. It is not without significance that
his first address of national importance
was concerned with imperfections in the
administration of justice. The task which
he undertook, and which he continues
with undiminished vigor, is that of im-
proving the administration of justice. It
is a task in which, happily for us, he has
met with a considerable amount of suc-
cess.
The St. Paul address may have earned
him a number of opponents as well as
friends, but it also won him national
recognition and an invitation to move
from the relative obscurity of the
Nebraska school to the more known and
more influential Northwestern University
Law School in Evanston, Illinois. While
there, he was instrumental in organizing
'The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With
the Administration of Justice, Address before
A.B.A. Annual Meeting (1906), reprinted in
20 J. AM. JUD. SoC'Y (1937).
the National Conference on Criminal Law
and Criminology and the Illinois Law
Review, of which he was editor-in-chief.
In 1909 he was appointed to the law
faculty of the University of Chicago. He
next became Carter Professor of Law at
Harvard Law School, and in 1916 was
elected dean of that school, a position he
held until his resignation in 1936. As
dean for twenty years of what is usually
considered the nation's most influential
law school he was in a position to exer-
cise an enormous impact upon the legal
profession. This influence was widened
in centrifugal circles as more than a
generation of students trained under him
entered the legal profession, many of
them as professors in other schools of
law. Upon his resignation from the
deanship of Harvard he continued an
active life as author, lecturer and teacher,
and performed such functions as serving
on a commission for the codification of
Chinese law. More recently he spent two
years in California organizing a new law
school at the University of California,
Los Angeles, before returning in the fall
of 1952 to Harvard.
The importance and influence of Pound
can hardly be called into question, but
rather than assume it to be known we
can cite a few of the many tributes to his
erudition. Professor Thomas A. Cowan
of Nebraska University credits him with
reworking the whole structure of Amer-
ican legal thought.2 Professor Paul Sayre
of New York University notes that all the
2Cowan, A Report on the Status of Philos-
ophy of Law in the United States, 50 COLUM.
L. REV. 1092 (1950).
rest of the legal scholars have lived off
Pound's erudition for more than forty
years. 3  Professor Edwin W. Patterson
finds Pound's influence in jurisprudence
an aid in preparing legislation, in predict-
ing legal trends and in interpreting legal
literature. He continues that Pound's
ideas have become commonplace, a fact
that is a tribute to his insight and vision. 4
Dean Emeritus Albert Kocourek of
Northwestern compares him to an Alpine
peak towering above all the surrounding
landscape.5 And, finally, Professor Her-
bert D. Laube of Cornell finds that the
genius of Pound is as penetrating as John
Austin's, as illuminating as Henry Maine's,
as resourceful as Rodolf von Ihering's
and as humanizing as Lester F. Ward's;
his influence is more widespread than
that of any jurist ever honored by the
Roman Empire.6 The tribute paid to him
on the occasion of his seventy-fifth birth-
day in 1947 is indicative of his inter-
national as well as his American reputa-
tion. 7
3 POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURIS-
PRUDENCE (5th ed. 1943), Sayre, Book Review,
57 HARV. L. REV. 581, 584-85 (1944).
4 Patterson, Pound's Theory o1 Social Interests,
INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOS-
OPHIES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROSCOE
POUND 560, 571 (Sayre ed. 1947).
5 Kocourek, Roscoe Pound as a Former
Colleague Knew Him, INTERPRETATIONS OF
MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 419.
6 SAYRE, INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHIES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
ROSCOE POUND (1947), 60 HARV. L. REV. 988
(1947).
7 Interpretations of Modern Legal Philosophies:
Essays in Honor of Roscoe Pound contains
essays by thirty-eight legal scholars from North
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Turning now from this brief biograph-
ical note 8 we take up the reasons he saw
for the "popular dissatisfaction with the
administration of justice" in order better
to understand what he hoped to accom-
plish. But to understand the problems
as he saw them and the solutions he
offers we must review, however briefly,
the legal and intellectual milieu into
which he entered at the turn of the cen-
tury. The principles of natural law which
served as the foundation of American
law in its inception, as stated in the
Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution, and which continued as the
dominant force in the formative era of
American law from the Revolution to the
Civil War, began to decline in import-
ance about the middle of the last century.
By the end of the century its importance
was negligible. 9
Beginning with the second half of the
last century the historical school of legal
and South America, South Africa, Australia
and Europe.
The Introduction contains many congratulatory
messages from many foreign jurists, legal asso-
ciations and politicians. Edmond N. Cahn finds
the fact that only two of the thirty-eight essays
deal directly with Pound, a tribute to the
fact that he created a widespread and informed
interest in legal philosophy where he had found
a generation composed almost entirely of igno-
ramuses and misologists. Cahn, Jurisprudence,
ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 1099, 1104 (1947).
8 For a bibliography of works about Pound
published before July 1, 1940, see SETARO, A
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WRITINGS OF ROSCOE
POUND 139-52 (1942).
9 POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN
LAW 101-02, 109-10 (1938).
RosCOE POUND
interpretation was in the ascendancy.
Many factors combined to explain this
phenomenon, not the least of which was
the fact that, in 1849, Luther S. Cush-
ing, a student of Savigny, was teaching
law at Harvard University. This fact in
addition to the appearance a few years
earlier of the writings of Kent (1826-30)
and Story (1832-45) led to widespread
acceptance of historical jurisprudence.' 0
The movement received new impetus
when, after 1870, American legal stu-
dents in increasing numbers were pur-
suing their studies in Germany. Stated
briefly this school maintains, after Savig-
ny, that law cannot be made but must
be found, the growth of law being an
unconscious, organic process with legisla-
tion subordinated to custom. As law
grows and becomes more complex and
the popular consciousness (Volksgeist)
cannot manifest itself directly, it becomes
represented by lawyers who formulate
the technical legal principles; the lawyers
do not form laws but formulate the pop-
ular consciousness; legislation follows as
the last stage. Laws are not universally
valid or applicable, but each people has
its own legal habits just as it has a
peculiar language which is not applicable
to others. In this system the jurist ranks
before the legislator in legal progress;
but the jurist does not make laws, rather
he develops the technique of following
the evolution of the Volksgeist by legal
10 Id. at 21: "With the rise of historical
thinking in the nineteenth century there comes
to be a combination of history and philosophy,
observable in Kent and marked in Story. The
stabilizing work of natural law is taken over
by history. .....
historical research.11  The historical
school has always been skeptical of leg-
islation and opposed to codification.
Competing with the historical school
for the primacy was another group which
Pound calls the school of "philosophical
jurisprudence." 12 This is a heterogen-
eous group comprising many philosophies
and various versions of natural-law juris-
prudence. For the most part they had
degenerated into a legal formalism, hold-
ing that a perfect legal system could be
deduced from an ideal of the nature of
law by a process of formal logic, valid
for all peoples, at all times and in every
place. This theory represents the re-
mains of the so-called "classical natural
law" of the eighteenth century which had
already been rejected on the Continent
and was rapidly losing favor in America.
Like proponents of historical jurispru-
dence, though for different reasons, they
maintained that law could not be made
but could only be found, the method of
finding it being different. Also like the
historical school, they doubted the pos-
sibility of creative legislation.
A third school which gained accept-
"FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 129 (2d ed.
1949). Friedmann cites the Hayward English
translation of Savigny as follows: ". . . the
sum therefore of this theory is that all law is
originally formed in the manner in which in
ordinary, but not quite correct language, cus-
tomary law is said to have been formed, i.e.,
that it is first developed by custom and popular
faith, next by jurisprudence, everywhere there-
fore by internal silently operating powers, not
by the arbitrary will of a law giver." Cf.
POUND, op. cit. supra note 9, at 115 (1938); 8
ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 477-92 (1932).
128 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 482 (1932); cf. PoUND,
op. cit. supra note 9; POUND, THE SPIRIT OF
THE COMMON LAW 151 (1921).
ance among many jurists was analytical
jurisprudence, of which Bentham was the
founder. Like Austin's mechanical juris-
prudence, the analytical school consid-
ered positive law to be self-sufficient,
divorced from any concept of natural law,
ethics, or the other social sciences. Tra-
ditionally the analytical school has had
unlimited confidence in man's ability to
legislate, and its advocates have always
favored codification. However, in the
last third of nineteenth century America,
Bentham's followers began to doubt that
we could add to or produce human hap-
piness by legislation. Consequently, they
developed what Pound calls a "juristic
pessimism" substantially the same as the
historical and philosophical schools. It is
a curious phenomenon that the different
schools by different paths, arrived at the
common conclusion that constructive leg-
islation was impossible? 3
Just before the turn of the century,
when Pound came to the bar, pragmatism
was coming into its own as the dominant
American philosophy. Initiated by
Charles Peirce, developed and popular-
ized by William James, and brought to
13 POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW
151 (1921). "Five types of philosophy of law
in the nineteenth century are of significance
for our present purpose. We may call those
who adhered to them the metaphysical school,
the historical school, the utilitarians, the
positivists and the mechanical sociologists. It
is a striking example of the way in which the
same conclusion may sustain the most divergent
philosophical premises that all of these arrived
ultimately at the same juristic position by
wholly diverse routes and from the most diverse
starting points, so that the futility of conscious
effort to improve the condition of humanity
through the law and the conception of justice
as the securing of the maxims of self-assertion
become axioms of juristic thought." Id. at 151.
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completion by John Dewey, pragmatism
has dominated the philosophical field for
more than half a century. Dean Pound
has frequently pointed out that legal
theory is very resistant to change and
usually lags a generation behind changes
in philosophical ideals. This was also
true of pragmatism, which had not seri-
ously affected juristic thinking at the turn
of the century. However, with the elo-
quent influence of Oliver W. Holmes,
pragmatism soon became the dominant
legal philosophy. More recently prag-
matism has divided into many, and often
contradictory, branches. The most vocal
contemporary group is the school of legal
realism, a name which Pound charac-
terizes as a boast rather than a descrip-
tion.14 This group did not merit serious
consideration when Pound first began his
career, but they are introduced here be-
cause much of his subsequent writing is
concerned with them. The realists deny
the efficacy not only of natural law and
positive law, but further they repudiate
the principle of judicial precedent, which
is the very cornerstone of the common-
law system.15 For them there is no law
except the judge's decision in the individ-
dual case, and that decision is law for
that case alone, not being drawn from
previous cases and not affecting future
cases.
14 POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW 63
(1951); cf. Pound, The Call For a Realistic
Jurisprudence, 44 HARv. L. REV. 697 (1931).
15 GARLAN, LEGAL REALISM AND JUSTICE 20-21,
24, 42 (1941). "A right-is an affair of the
future, and for the individual who claims the
right it is an affair of probability." Id. at 93.
Cf. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND
(1930).
RoscoE POUND
In the light of this review, however
brief, of his intellectual environment we
can now pose the problems which Pound
saw and to the correction of which he
set his mind and his pen. Some of
these problems are not original with
Pound or peculiar to America, but as
ancient as law itself. Others, however,
are a peculiar product of the time and
place.
The first problem, which he calls the
"perennial problem" of law because it
goes back to the very beginnings of law,
has two aspects, but because of their
close association they can be, and are,
treated as one. These two aspects are,
first, the general security versus the in-
dividual life, and secondly, the need for
stability versus the need for change. Dif-
ferent legal theories at different times
have maintained one of these at the ex-
pense of the other. Pound feels that these
preferences cannot be maintained. In
America, during the last century, the gen-
eral security was preferred. In the pres-
ent century, there is a tendency to prefer
the individual life.' The problem is to
have a legal system which gives recogni-
tion to one without destroying the other.
The formalists and analytical school pro-
tected the general security by providing
in advance for every eventuality, but they
gave no consideration to the individual
offender; the law had to be applied me-
10 POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOS-
OPHY OF LAW 96 (1922). "The last century
preferred the general security. The present
century has shown many signs of preferring
the individual moral and social life. I doubt
whether such preferences can maintain them-
selves." Ibid. Cf. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
IN AMERICA 38 (1930).
chanically. Contrariwise the historical
school, and even more so the realists,
consider only the individual case, thereby
endangering the general security.
Considering the problem from the
viewpoint of stability versus change, the
alignment is almost the same. For the
formalists and analytical jurists the per-
fect code is valid for all times. For the
historians and realists there is only
change.' 7 Stability is required so that
men may plan a course of action with a
reasonable expectancy of what course the
law will take. It is particularly true in
economic fields that men wish to act with
confidence that their operations of today
will not be judged illegal tomorrow. At
the same time the law may not be so
rigorous as not to accommodate itself to
the changes in society which are con-
stantly taking place.
There were other problems, more pe-
culiar to the time and place, in Pound's
mind, not only in his famous St. Paul
address, but in much of his subsequent
speaking and writing. The first of these,
already intimated, was what he calls
"juristic pessimism." 18 The various
schools of jurisprudence, from diverse
premises, arrived at the common conclu-
sion that legislation is impossible or use-
less. This give-it-up philosophy generated
the attitude that you cannot do anything,
therefore do not try to do anything.
Against this attitude Pound has been a
relentless foe.
Secondly, a major problem for Amer-
ican jurisprudence was created by the
17 Cf. FRANK, op. cit. supra note 15.
18 Cf. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON
LAW (1921).
enormous changes in the social and eco-
nomic order. The law, as received into
America and developed during the form-
ative era, was ideally adapted to a pio-
neer, agricultural society. But by the turn
of the century the era of expansion and
frontier was rapidly being passed and the
country was becoming an urban, indus-
trial society. Changes in law had not
kept pace with the changes in the struc-
ture of society. 19
A third problem which he attacked was
the inadequate education of the legal pro-
fession. One could with reason cite
Pound's own biography as indicative of
the meager requirements for admission
to the bar. That he became the most
eminent among the legal scholars is a
tribute to his own initiative and genius
and not to the demands of the legal pro-
fession. That these demands were not
exacting can be seen from the fact that
he was admitted to the bar before reach-
ing the age of twenty after having already
begun a career as a botanist. In the be-
ginning of American legal history this
was not accidental but part of a policy.
An excessive fervor for democracy and
universal equality fostered the idea that
no professional class should be set apart;
every profession should be accessible to
all.20 He cites examples of blacksmiths,
farmers and common laborers who were
justices of state supreme courts . 1 The
19 POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN
LAW 98 (1938); POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AND THE COMMON LAW 19 (1930); POUND,
THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW ch. 5
(1921).
2 0 POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN
LAW 8 (1938).
21 Ibid.
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practice of apprentice-training for lawyers
persisted well into the present century,
and almost anybody could serve a term
as a clerk in an attorney's office and then
go into practice for himself. 22 The situa-
tion reached such proportions as to
prompt Mr. Justice Miller to remark that
the prime factor in the formation of our
law was ignorance.23
A fourth problem is seen in the in-
adequate and poor legislation provided
by the lawmaking bodies of our govern-
ment. Reasons for this legislative inade-
quacy are various, but certainly one rea-
son was the traditional common-law
attitude toward legislation. The common-
law jurist is wont to give very little recog-
nition to legislative law, or, at best, to
interpret it very strictly as applying to
the particular case in point and not as
providing a point of departure for legal
reasoning. This attitude in turn led to
legislative irresponsibility, prompting leg-
islators to give only skeleton rules or
directives, the details of which were to
be worked out by judicial decision; or
they turned out laws which were prac-
tically unenforceable. Another reason
can be found in a tendency of the legis-
lative branch to meddle in judicial func-
tions during the very early period of
legal history. The net result was a grow-
ing popular distrust of legislatures and a
turning to the judiciary not only for
judgment but also for making law. Judi-
cial empiricism became the common man-
ner of lawmaking. 24
22POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 145
(1930).
23 POUND, op. cit. supra note 20.
24 POUND, op. cit. supra note 20, at 39, 49, 59.
ROSCOE POUND
Related to this difficulty is a fifth prob-
lem of more recent origin. It is what
Pound calls administrative or executive
justice as contrasted with judicial justice.
In recent years, and particularly in the
last two decades, he sees a growing, and
undesirable, tendency for the executive
branch of the government to assume
many functions belonging properly to the
judiciary.25 This is seen as undesirable
because the executive branch is not ex
officio qualified by training and experi-
ence for the judicial functions. More im-
portant, he sees in administrative justice
a tendency towards absolutism. 2 6
Finally, a sixth problem requiring at-
tention is the tendency, developed in the
last half of the last century, to mix law
and politics. Another name for the same
problem is the elective judiciary. 27  He
can see no correlation between a man's
qualifications to act as a judge and his
ability to influence voters to elect him to
the position of a judge. 28 The general
acceptance of the elected bench in state
and local jurisdictions has had an unde-
sirable effect on the administration of
justice. 29 The desire to please the voter
or political patron whose support can in-
sure the judge's position is too frequently
an impediment to justice.
Other problems could be considered,
25 POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW 76-78,
83 (1951); cf. POUND, NEW PATHS OF THE
LAW ch. 3 (1950); POUND, THE FORMATIVE
ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938).
20 POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW 76-78,
83 (1951).
27 POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 185
(1930); cf. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF
AMERICAN LAW (1938).
28 Ibid.
29 ibid.
and their omission is not to be considered
as granting them a slight importance.
The purpose here is to mention the main
problems which Pound attempted to solve
as a background against which to view
his theories on law. Further it is felt
that almost any other problem that might
be mentioned could be subsumed under
one of those already indicated. It should
not be expected that our author will sin-
gle out each of these problems for in-
dividual treatment. Rather does he at-
tempt a solution that will strike at the
roots of all of them simultaneously.
In studying his predecessors Pound saw
that all the nineteenth century schools
were subject to the common criticism of
attempting to construct a science of law
solely in terms of law and on the basis
of law, divorced from all other phe-
nomena of social control and civiliza-
tion. 0 For him a legal science, in order
to meet the needs of a changing society,
must give up its exclusiveness and work
in closer association with the other social
sciences.3' It must view law in all of its
senses in relation to the whole problem
of social control. 32 The social purposes
of law must be stressed more than the
sanctions, for law is to be regarded as a
social institution which can be improved
by intelligent effort.3 3 To discover the
best means of directing and furthering
efforts to improve the law, the jurist must
30 Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence (pt. 1),
51 HARV. L. REV. 444 (1938).
32 Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence (pt. 2),
52 HARV. L. REV. 777, 812 (1938).
32 Ibid.
3' Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociolog-
ical Jurisprudence (pt. 3), 25 HARv. L. REV.
489 (1912).
be concerned with a wide range of
studies, and not just of law. This re-
quires a study of the actual effects of
legal institutions and doctrines; a study
of the means of making legal rules effec-
tive; a sociological legal history, which is
a study not only of how doctrines have
evolved and developed, considered solely
as jural materials, but of what social ef-
fects the doctrines of law have produced
in the past and how they produce them.34
The study of legal history is very import-
ant to see what effects the jurists desired
to produce, the effects actually produced
and the method used to produce the de-
sired effect. The functional attitude,
which is the study not only of what legal
materials are and how they came to be,
but also of what they aim to effect and
how they work, is fundamental in Pound's
legal theory. Also, there must necessarily
be intensive study of philosophy and psy-
chology; in order for a legal science to
be valuable it must be consistent with
the best of modem philosophy and psy-
chology.3"
Pound pursued this course of studies
very seriously. He studied all the con-
temporary jurists, both of the English
common-law jurisdictions and the con-
tinental civil law systems, taking freely
from the most diverse schools of thought
the materials which he found useful; he
considered that there can be many ap-
proaches to juristic truth and that each
3.Pound, supra note 33, at 513-14; cf. POUND,
OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE
32-34 (5th ed. 1943).
3 Pound, A Call for a Realistic Jurisprudence,
44 HARv. L. REV. 697, 710-11 (1931); cf.
POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURIS-
PRUDENCE 35 (5th ed. 1943).
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can be significant to a particular prob-
lem. 36 Nor was legal history neglected;
he studied widely the legal systems of
the past.37 In like manner he gave him-
self to the study of modem philosophy,
psychology and sociology. In sum, there
is scarcely anyone among modern and
contemporary sociologists, philosophers
and jurists to whom he does not owe,
and acknowledge, a debt. 8
It was in the light of these extensive
studies that Pound developed his system
of sociological jurisprudence. It presents
a curious union of many diverse, and
often contradictory, philosophies of law.
But to this peculiar union he does give a
fundamental unity based on the purpose
of law.
The Nature of Law
Before entering upon a detailed discus-
sion of the nature of law according to
Pound, it is necessary first to have a clear
notion of our subject. It is to Pound's
credit that, among English-speaking jur-
ists, he has done much in clarifying the
meaning, or diverse meanings, of "law."
Frequently among treatises on law we
find the term applied indiscriminately to
any one of a number of possibilities with-
out distinction.
For Pound "law" has three meanings:
first, it signifies the legal order, i.e., the
6 MPound, supra note 35, at 711.
37 POUND, INTERPRETATIONS ON LEGAL HISTORY
(1923).
3sPound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence (pts.
1-2), 51-52 HARv. L. REV. 444, 777 (1938);
Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological
Jurisprudence (pt. 3), 25 HARv. L. REV. 489
(1912); cf. Thomas Cowan's article in INTER-
PRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND 130-42
(Sayre ed. 1947).
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ordering of human conduct through the
systematic application of the force of
politically organized society. In this sense
it is called a regime of social control.
Secondly, it means the sum of the au-
thoritative grounds for judicial and ad-
ministrative decisions in such a society.
Thirdly, it may mean what is called the
"judicial process." A fourth meaning can
be added since the term "law" can be,
and often is, used to mean all three of
the other meanings just mentioned.3 9
When we speak of a "science of law,"
we are using the term in the second
sense. It is in this sense that Dean Pound
uses the term in analyzing the science of
law,40 and it is likewise in this sense that
it will be used here unless otherwise in-
dicated.
Used in this second sense as the body
of authoritative grounds for decisions,
law is not a simple concept. There are
contained within it three elements: pre-
cepts, technique, and ideals.4 1  Further-
3, Pound, A Comparison of Ideals of Law, 47
HARV. L. REV. 1-2 (1933); cf. POUND, JUSTICE
ACCORDING TO LAW 48 (1951); Pound,
My Philosophy of Law, MY PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW, CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS
(1941).
40 See POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW
49 (1951): "The second sense is the one in
which Lawyers habitually use the term 'law.'
It is the meaning which the word has borne
since the classical Roman jurists and the one
to which we may well restrict it in the science
of Law." Ibid.
4) POUND, op. cit. supra note 40, at 50.
"[Alnalytical jurists had in mind the precept
element of law . . . historical jurists had in
mind very largely the [technique] traditional
art of the lawyer's craft . . . and philosophical
jurists had in mind the ideal element in law.
Today we may very well give up these dis-
cussions. All three elements should be con-
sidered and together they constitute the back-
more, the element of precepts contains
within itself four distinct concepts. First,
there is the rule or precept in the strict
sense, which determines a detailed set of
consequences for a determined state of
facts. Secondly, there are principles or
authoritative starting points for legal rea-
soning. Thirdly, there are legal concep-
tions or authoritative categories into
which cases are fitted, and by reason of
which certain rules and principles become
applicable, as, for example, sale and
trust. And, fourthly, there are standards 42
or measures of conduct prescribed
by law from which one departs at his
own peril, as, for example, the standard
of due care not to cause an unreasonable
risk of injury to others.4
In speaking of law in this second sense
there is a temptation to think only of
precepts, and then only of the rules or
precepts in the strict sense. But in truth
the element of technique, or "art of the
lawyers' craft," and the element of ideals
are quite as authoritative and no less im-
portant. It is the element of technique
which distinguishes the two great modern
systems of the law.4 4 The technique of
the common-law lawyer consists in reason-
ing by analogy from reported judicial de-
cisions while considering statutes as fur-
nishing a rule for the class within its pur-
ground of juristic writing and judicial decision."
8 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 486 (1932).
4 POUND, op. cit. supra note 40, at 58. "There
is a characteristic element of fairness or reason-
ableness in standards which makes them a
point of contact between law and morals." Ibid.
43 Id. at 56-58. See, e.g., POUND, SOURCES AND
FORMS OF LAW (1946); 8 ENCYC. SOC. SCI.
477-92 (1932).
44POUND, op. cit. supra note 40, at 50-51;
POUND, THE TASK OF LAW 47-48 (1944).
view and not as a starting point for legal
reasoning. The civil law, on the contrary,
reasons by analogy from legislative pre-
cepts while considering court decisions as
establishing only one precise point for
the case in litigation and not as a point
of departure for legal reasoning.
Like technique, the ideal element does
not determine a detailed set of conse-
quences for a detailed state of facts. But,
in the deciding of causes, it is of great
importance and is, indeed, decisive in
new cases when there is necessity of
choosing from among equally authorita-
tive principles. This ideal element is "a
picture of the social order of the time
and place, a legal tradition as to what
the social order is and so as to what is
the purpose of social control, which is
the authoritative background of interpre-
tation and application of legal pre-
cepts." 45 The ideal element, in that it
presents a picture of what the legal order
ought to be and what it ought to achieve,
is undoubtedly the most important ele-
ment.4 6 This is just, since in practical
science the end is first in intention and
is an element in the premises of the prac-
tical discourse. As we shall have occa-
sion to see in greater detail later, the
ideal element has a preponderant role
when there is question of weighing inter-
ests to determine which one shall be
45 POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW 54
(1951); POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMER-
ICAN LAW 28-29 (1938); Pound, A Comparison
of Ideals of Law, 47 HARV. L. REV. 2-3
(1933); Pound, The Ideal Element in American
Judicial Decision, 45 HARV. L. REV. 147-48
(1931); Pound, The Theory of Judicial
Decision, 21 HARV. L. REV. 958 (1923).
46 Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 21
HARV. L. REV. 958 (1923).
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recognized and to what extent it shall be
recognized.
Considering the elements just discussed
we can define law as "a body of authori-
tative precepts, developed and applied by
an authoritative technique in the light of
authoritative traditional ideals." 47 This
is a definition of law in its second sense,
and is the way it is used in the science
of law. It is, therefore, this sense of the
word with which we are chiefly con-
cerned. However, at this time it would
not be without value to examine other
meanings of law given by Pound from
different points of view. Since it is ex-
tremely difficult to find a definition in
the writings of Dean Pound, the nearest
approach is descriptions from different
points of view. Besides the one just given
we find three others that consistently ap-
pear in Pound's writings.
Firstly, as a regime, law is defined as
a highly specialized form of social control
in a politically organized society exercised
through the systematic and orderly ap-
plication of the force of such a society.
48
It is the force of politically organized so-
ciety which constitutes the formal element
of law.
From still another point of view, which
might aptly be called the origin, law is
defined as experience developed by rea-
son and reason tested by experience; it
is experience organized and developed by
reason, authoritatively promulgated by
the lawmaking organs of society and
47POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW 50
(1951).
4 POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW 48
(1951); Pound, My Philosophy of Law, My
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, CREDOS OF SIXTEEN
AMERICAN SCHOLARS 249 (1941).
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backed by the force of that society.4 9
The importance of reason is insisted upon
throughout, but it is not reason operating
in a vacuum. It must be reason tested
and guided by experience.
Finally, viewed with regard to its end,
law is defined as a task of social en-
gineering designed to eliminate friction
and waste in the satisfaction of unlimited
human interests and demands out of a
limited store of goods in existence.50 This
is undoubtedly the most important aspect
of Pound's doctrine of law. He insists
always that law cannot be judged with
reference to itself, as the analytical school
judges, or with respect to an ideal picture
of law, as the formalists do, but must
be judged functionally with respect to its
end. The relationship between this view
of law and the ideal element already dis-
cussed is readily seen, since it is the ideal
element which proposes the end which
the law should effect and it is with a
view to the ideal element that demands
and interests are classified and either
granted or denied recognition.
Having seen four definitions of law
from different points of view, we can
make a synthesis and achieve a composite
definition comprising all the meanings
given by Pound: Law is a system of
guides to judicial decisions, including pre-
cepts, technique, and ideals, found by
reason, tested by experience, promulgated
by the authority of politically organized
society and backed by the force of that
society, for the purpose of securing the
maximum of human interests and satisfy-
ing the maximum of human demands
49 POUND, THE TASK OF LAW 62 (1944).
5( POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 64
(1942); 8 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 487 (1932).
with a minimum of friction and waste.
This composite definition reveals essen-
tially the nature of law according to
Pound, but it must be elaborated in a
little more detail. He constantly refers to
law as a process of social engineering.
This, however, is somewhat misleading.
The analogy with engineering is not im-
mediately evident. Engineering is a prac-
tical art which seeks to bring into con-
crete existence a plan which has been
conceived and drawn up in detail in ad-
vance. It is difficult to see that Pound
looks upon law as striving to achieve an
orderly plan which has been well for-
mulated in advance. He expressly denies
that law is a reflection of divine reason
governing the universe or of a God-given
order.5 1 Rather it is a process of social
adjusting; a system of practical com-
promises of conflicting and overlapping
interests."2
In a world in which there are an un-
limited number of human demands and
desires but where the means of satisfying
those demands are limited it is inevitable
that conflicts should arise. These conflicts
are resolved by giving legal effect to one
interest which thus becomes a legal right,
or simply a "right." In law we must
reconcile and adjust these conflicting in-
terests or claims so as to secure as much
of the totality of them as we can.5
51 Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision (pt.
3), 21 HARV. L. REV. 594 (1923).
52 POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN
LAW 125-26 (1938).
53 POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW 31
(1951); cfI. Pound, My Philosophy of Law, MY
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, CREDOS OF SIXTEEN
AMERICAN SCHOLARS 259 (1941); Pound, Philo-
sophical Theory and International Law, 1
BIBLIOTHECA VISSERIANA 89 (1923).
It is incorrect, Pound tells us, to speak
of rights before interests have been de-
fined, delimited, and recognized by law.
Once this has been done, "rights" are the
means by which interests are secured.
Theories of natural right erred in con-
fusing the interest which the law should
secure with the rights by which it is se-
cured. For Pound a natural right is
nothing other than an interest which we
think should be secured, a demand which
we think ought to be satisfied.5 4 An in-
terest exists independently of any law
and is not a creature of the state, but
it is an error to think that it has any
binding force until defined, delimited, and
recognized by the law.
In the light of what principles are these
interests classified, defined, delimited and
recognized? Pound renounces any pre-
tense of immutable principles or absolute
judgments. For him it is a matter of
compromise of conflicting interests.5 5 So
long as a satisfactory compromise can be
reached and we may satisfy a social want
without a disproportionate sacrifice of
other interests there are no natural, neces-
sary reasons why we should not do so.
Not all interests can be satisfied, at least
not fully; where interests of equal valor
are in conflict they must be reconciled
5-4 POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW
91-92 (1921).
55 "But I am skeptical as to the possibility of
an absolute judgment. We are confronted at
this point by a fundamental question of social
and political philosophy. I do not believe that
the jurist has to do more than recognize the
problem and perceive that it is presented to
him as one of securing all social interests so
far as he may, of maintaining harmony among
them that is compatible with the securing of
all of them." POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 96 (1922).
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and compromised so that neither is fully
satisfied nor completely sacrificed.5
Pound has outlined an elaborate hier-
archical system of interests which are to
be recognized, or are pressing for recog-
nition. It is not our intention to enter
into the practical details of his legal
theory to too great an extent, but since
this theory of interests forms the central
core of his theory it must be presented at
least in summary form. The interests
which the law should recognize and to
which it should give effect are classified
in three major groups. They are social
interests, public interests, and individual
interests.5 7 An interest, for the purpose
of the law, is a claim or demand which
human beings make either as individuals
or in groups or associations and of which
the legal order must take account. Individ-
ual interests are those claims which in-
dividuals make as individuals and assert
in title of that individual life. Public in-
terests are those claims asserted in title
of life in politically organized society.
And, finally, social interests are those de-
mands and claims asserted in title of so-
cial life in civilized society; they are
treated as the claims of the entire social
5, "What I do say is, that if in any field of
human conduct or in any human relation the
law, with such machinery as it has, may satisfy
a social want without a disproportionate sac-
rifice of other claims, there is no eternal limi-
tation inherent in the nature of things, there
are no bounds imposed at creation, to stand
in the way of its doing so." POUND, Op. Cit.
supra note 55, at 97-98; cf. POUND, SOCIAL
CONTROL THROUGH LAW 78 (1942).
5 Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1943); cf. POUND, THE TASK
OF LAW (1944); POUND, OUTLINES OF LEC-
TURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1943);
POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW (1942).
This division is attributed to Ihering.
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group. 58 Not every claim that men might
make is necessarily or always in one of
these groups, but when they are com-
pared for the purpose of adjusting con-
flicts they must be compared with refer-
ence to the same group. In general, they
should be compared under the most gen-
eral form, i.e., social interests. 59 While
the law of the last century saw only in-
dividual interests, the law today is more
and more subsuming them to social in-
terests. Wherever a demand can be sat-
isfied if treated as a social interest rather
than an individual one, it should be con-
sidered a social interest. 60  For this rea-
son Dean Pound devotes most of his
planning to social interests as being the
more inclusive order.
The first of Pound's social interests is
the interest in the general security. This
is a claim that social life be secure against
forms of actions and courses of conduct
which threaten its existence. In its sim-
plest form, this interest is concerned with
the general safety as the highest law, but
it extends to such forms as interest in
general morals, general health, peace,
order, security of transactions and of ac-
quisitions.
Second is the social interest in the
security of social institutions, i.e., the
claim that fundamental institutions of so-
cial life be secure from courses of con-
duct that threaten their existence or im-
58 Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV.
L. REV. 1-2 (1943).
59 Id. at 2-3.
60 Pound, A Comparison of Ideals of Law,
47 HARv. L. REV. 15 (1933); cf. POUND,
OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 32-
34 (5th ed. 1943); Pound, The Scope and
Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pt. 3),
25 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1912).
pair their efficiency. This includes inter-
est in the security of domestic institutions,
religious institutions, political institutions,
and, more recently, economic institutions.
Pound's third social interest is in the
general morals, or the claim that social
life in civilized society be secure against
forms of action offensive to the moral
sentiments of the general body of individ-
uals therein for the time being. This in-
cludes policies against such misdemeanors
as dishonesty, corruption, gambling and
things of immoral tendency.
Fourthly, there is the social interest in
the conservation of social resources, or
the claim that the goods of existence shall
not be wasted; that courses of conduct
which tend needlessly to destroy these
goods be restrained. This refers chiefly
to common property which is used but
not owned by individuals, and is closely
related to the interest in the protection
and training of dependents and defectives.
Fifth is the social interest in general
progress, or the demand that the develop-
ment of human powers and of human
control over nature for the satisfaction of
human wants go forward; the claim that
social engineering be increasingly and
continuously improved for the develop-
ment of human powers. This includes
interest in economic, political and cul-
tural progress.
Sixth, and last, is the social interest in
the individual life. This is in many ways
the most important. It is the claim that
each individual be able to live a human
life in civilized society according to the
standards of that society.
Such, in brief, are the social interests
which are recognized or are coming to
be recognized by the law.6 1 When looked
at functionally, and it is in this way that
it must be viewed,6 2 the law is an attempt
to satisfy, to reconcile, these conflicting
and overlapping interests and claims
either through securing them directly, or
through securing certain individual inter-
ests so as to give effect to the greatest
total of interests, or the interests that
weigh most, with the least possible sac-
rifice of the scheme of interests as a
whole.
The public and individual interests are
less elaborately treated by Pound and the
reason is not difficult to divine. From
the social interests just presented it is
possible to see how most of the public
and individual interests could be sub-
sumed to the social interests. And where
this is possible, he finds it desirable that
it should be so done.63 Yet he does not
neglect the public or individual interests
altogether. The public interest is, first,
the interest of the state as a juristic per-
G6The essentials of this summary are taken
from Pound, supra note 58. They may also
be found in: POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES
ON JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1943); POUND, SO-
CIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW (1942); POUND,
THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW (1921);
cf. Patterson, Pound's Theory of Social In-
terests, INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHIES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROSCOE
POUND (Sayre ed. 1947); FRIEDMANN, LEGAL
THEORY 230-31 (2d ed. 1949).
62Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence (pt.
2), 52 HARV. L. REV. 777, 812 (1938); POUND,
OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 32-
34 (5th ed. 1943); POUND, INTERPRETATIONS
OF LEGAL HISTORY (1923); Pound, The Call
for a Realistic Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV.
697, 710 (1931); Pound, The Scope and Pur-
pose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pt. 3), 25
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1912).
63 Cf. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA
145 (1930).
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son. This interest includes the claim to
integrity, freedom of action and honor of
the state as a moral person, as well as
the claim of the state as a corporation to
hold property for corporate purpose.
And, secondly, there is the interest of
the state as the guardian of social inter-
ests.6" But, he concludes, to the extent
that the public interest is one only of the
dignity of the sovereign, it ought to give
way under modern conditions."5 As al-
ready mentioned, whenever possible the
interests should be subsumed to the social
interests as the more inclusive order. In-
dividual interests are given a still more
summary treatment. Most of the interests
which formerly were granted as belonging
to individuals as individuals are now, he
says, subsumed under social interests.
Thus the right of the individual to pos-
sess property is taken as a social interest
in security of possessions. 66 The right to
expect exact performance of promises and
contracts is subsumed to the social in-
terest in security of contract and transac-
tions.67 However, the common law is
coming more and more to recognize the
binding force of such promises.6
It remains to be seen upon what basis
these interests are so classified and either
recognized or denied recognition. Pound
believes that the basis for such a classi-
fication is what he calls the presupposi-
64Pound, A Survey of Public Interests, 58
HARV. L. REV. 910 (1945).
65Id. at 925.
66 Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57
HARv. L. REV. 1, 20 (1943); cf. POUND, AN
INTRODUCTION '10 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
234 (1922).
67 Pound, supra note 66; cf. POUND, op. cit.
supra note 66, at 237.
684 ENCYC. Soc. ScI. 42 (1932).
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tions of civilization, or, the "jural postu-
lates." These are the reasonable expec-
tations which all men have in civilized
society. They are the minimum require-
ments in order that that society may
survive.69 Stated briefly these postulates
are, first, in civilized society men must
be able to assume that men will commit
no intentional aggressions upon them.
Secondly, we must assume that men may
control for beneficial purposes what they
have discovered and appropriated for
their own use, created by their own labor,
or acquired according to the existing so-
cial and economic order. Third, we must
assume that those with whom we deal
will act in good faith, making good their
promises, carrying out their undertakings
according to the expectations of the mor-
al sentiment of the community, and re-
storing specifically or by equivalent what
comes to them by mistake or in any way
whereby they receive at another's expense
what they could not expect to receive
under other circumstances. Fourth, we
must assume that men will act with due
care not to cast on others an unreason-
able risk of injury. And, finally, we as-
sume that those who keep things, such as
animals, which are likely to get out of
hand and do damage will restrain them
within proper bounds. 0
69 POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 169-79, 188 (1922); cf. POUND, IN-
TERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 148-49
(1923); POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW
112 (1942); POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COM-
MON LAW 82 (1921). Pound admits borrow-
ing these postulates from Kohler. Cf. KOHLER,
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 83 (1914).
7O POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 169-79, 188 (1922); cf. FRIEDMANN,
LEGAL THEORY 233 (2d ed. 1949); De Sloov~re,
In the light of these "jural postulates"
the various interests which press for rec-
ognition are examined, defined, delimited
and, if recognition is granted, they are
secured by the law.
The End of Law
What the end of law should be accord-
ing to Pound has already been briefly
intimated but since it plays such a pre-
ponderant role in his legal theory it must
receive greater consideration than already
given.
Analyzing the history of law Pound
finds three theories of the end of law
that have been held successively in legal
history and a fourth which is beginning
to assert itself. The first, and simplest,
which existed in the period of primitive
law, was that of keeping the peace at
any price.71  Under the influence of
Greek philosophers this was superseded
by the second theory which was one of
preserving the status quo. This theory
maintained itself through the period of
classical Roman law, and, except for a
brief interruption of primitive law under
German influence, through the Middle
Ages. 72  According to this theory, the
end of law is to insure social stability by
putting everybody in his place and keep-
ing him there. Emphasis is on the social
order, with the individual destined to
serve that order at all costs to personal
liberty.
Jurisprudence, ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 913, 920-
21 (1942); POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL
HISTORY 148-49 (1923).
11 POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOS-
OPHY OF LAW 72-74 (1922); POUND, THE SPIRIT
OF THE COMMON LAW 85-87 (1921).
72 POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 78-79 (1922).
With the beginning of law in the
modern sense, after the Protestant Revolu-
tion, the emphasis shifted from society to
the individual. At first the purpose of
law was conceived as securing natural
rights, which got their warrant from the
inherent moral qualities of man; there
should be no restraint for any other pur-
pose. In the nineteenth century, this
mode of thought turned metaphysical with
juristic emphasis on individual conscious-
ness; the social problem was one of
reconciling conflicting human wills. Kant
had rationalized the law in these terms
as a system of principles or universal
rules applied to human actions whereby
the free will of each might coexist with
the free will of all others making a maxi-
mum of self-expression the end of law.
Hegel also emphasized liberty and
rationalized law as an idea of liberty
being realized in human experience.
Bentham considered law as a body of
rules laid down and enforced by the state,
the end of which was to secure a maxi-
mum of happiness conceived as free in-
dividual self-assertion. Spencer also
conceived of the function of law as
promotion, the liberty of each limited
only by the liberty of all. 73  In any of
these ways, the end of law was conceived
as that of securing the greatest possible
individual self-assertion.
Toward the end of the last century
and the beginning of the present, the
emphasis in juristic thinking began to
shift from human wills to human wants
or desires. Instead of thinking of the
73 POUND, op. cit. supra note 72, at 83-84;
POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 87,
194 (1921).
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end of law as the maximum of self-
assertion jurists began to think of it as
the maximum satisfaction of wants and
interests. The problem for jurisprudence
became one of finding the criteria of the
relative value of interests.7 4  Pound adopts
this German Interessenjurisprudenz, de-
veloped from the ideas of Ihering, and
gave it its greatest elaboration in his
sociological jurisprudence.
Law is spoken of by Pound as one
very specialized form of social control.7 5
As such, the end of law must ultimately
be the same as the entire system of social
control, the other agencies of which are
morals, religion, family and school. And
so he tells us that the end of law is, at
bottom, the end of social control.76  But
the other agencies of social control no
longer exercise an organized effect. 77
Hence, in modern society, law has be-
come the paramount agency.7
8
74 POUND, op. cit. supra note 72, at 89;
POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW 19-20
(1951); cf. POUND, NEW PATHS OF THE LAW
4-5 (1950).
75Compare the definitions of law as found
in footnotes 48-50 supra.
76PoUND, My Philosophy of Law, My PHI-
LOSOPHY OF LAW, CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN
SCHOLARS 250-52 (1941): "If, as lawyers must,
we look at law, in all of its senses, functionally
with respect to its end, as the end is at bottom
the end of social control, our science of law
cannot be self-sufficient. Ethics has to do with
another great agency of social control covering
much of the ground covered by the legal
order and having much to tell us as to what
legal precepts ought to be and ought to bring
about."
,7 POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 21-
25 (1942).
78 POUND, op. cit. supra note 77, at 20: "In
the modern world law has become the par-
amount agency of social control. Our main re-
liance in the society of today is upon the force
of politically organized society."
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Now, we can ask, what is the end of
social control of which law is the para-
mount agency? It is defined as an ideal
of co-operation toward civilization, to
raising human powers to their highest
possible unfolding, to a maximum of
human control over external and internal
nature for human purposes.79 Pound is
speaking in the same vein when he refers
to law as giving external support to man's
social instincts as against his selfish,
aggressive instincts, approving the opinions
of some last-century jurists who spoke of
law and government as extensions of in-
dividual self-control.,' Law, unlike the
laws of physical sciences which are
based on observation of what is, must be
based on experience and observation of
what ought to be, of how men ought to
conduct themselves in relation with
others.8 ' The law is compared to some
traffic regulations, such as lines in the
151POUND, op. cit. supra note 77, at 127,
132: "An ideal of civilization of raising human
powers to their highest possible unfolding of
the maximum of human control over external
nature and over internal nature for human
purposes .. "; Cf. POUND, A SURVEY OF SOCIAL
INTERESTS 30 (1943): "Social interest in gen-
eral progress, that is the claim . . . that the
development of human powers and of human
control over nature for the satisfaction of
human wants go forward, the demand that
social engineering be increasingly and continu-
ously improved, as it were the self-assertion of
the social group toward higher and more com-
plete development of human powers."
80 POUND, THE TASK OF LAW 25-26 (1944).
81 POUND, op. cit. supra note 80, at 49; POUND,
SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 32 (1942):
"But we are not dealing with physical nature,
as to which opinions of good and bad and
criticisms of its phenomena are irrelevant. We
are dealing with phenomena in the domain and
under the control of the human will and that
it does not tell the whole story. Here the
ultimate question is always what ought to be.
middle of a road, which direct human
actions the way they ought to go.82 Still
using traffic regulations as an example, he
tells us that law must form habits of
proper behavior instead of waiting for
them to develop,89 even though the reason-
ableness of the law is not apparent at
once to all. In still other instances he
says that the end of law is justice, which
in turn is defined as "an ideal relation
among men." 84
Looked at functionally with respect to
its end, which is the end of social control,
law is not self-sufficient. It depends
upon other agencies, especially ethics, to
point out what legal precepts ought to be
and what they ought to effect.8 5
This presentation of the end of law
would be readily acceptable to any
scholastic philosopher and it is all found
in Pound's writings. However, he fre-
quently contradicts these statements or
qualifies them until they have no mean-
ing, or at least, no acceptable meaning
left. Thus the highest development of
human powers 86 loses some of its lofty
appeal in his survey of social interests
when he goes on to explain that this fifth
interest, which he calls the "social in-
terest in general progress," 87 covers
." See also 8 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 485
(1932).
82 POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 29
(1930).
83 POUND, op. cit. supra note 80, at 65; cf.
POUND, JUSTICE AcCORING To LAW 17 (1951).
84 POUND, op. cit. supra note 80, at 19.
85 POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 62
(1942); Pound, My Philosophy of Law, MY
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, CREDOS OF SIXTEEN
AMERICAN SCHOLARS 252 (1941).
8r Cf. note 9 supra.
87 POUND, A SURVEY OF SOCIAL INTERESTS 30
(1943).
such major policies as freedom of prop-
erty, free trade and protection from
monopoly, free industry, and encourage-
ment of inventions, as well as a policy of
political progress through free criticism,
free education and the like.""
The conflict between selfish instinct
and social instincts 89 which law is to help
control is seen to be a conflict between
moral virtue and justice. The self-
assertive instincts are identified with in-
dividual moral development and the so-
cial instincts with justice. The two are
seen to be in essential conflict. Hence
law must maintain one set of moral
values against another.90
By justice as the end of law, Pound
does not mean an individual virtue; nor
does he mean the ideal relation among
men. Rather he means a regime, an
adjustment of relations and ordering of
conduct so as to satisfy the maximum of
88 Ibid.
89 Cf. note 10 supra.
'
0 POUND, THE TASK OF LAW 25, 36 (1944):
"Undoubtedly there are inherent difficulties in
a regime of justice according to law. But we
must pay a price for order, security, and a
developed economic order. We must pay a
price for a balance of security, justice in the
sense of the ideal relation among men, and
morals in the sense of the highest individual
development. No one of these can be carried
out to a logical extreme at the expense of the
others. Free individual self-assertion-spontan-
eous free activity-on the one hand, and
ordered, even regimented cooperation, are both
agencies of civilization. A social order which
ignores and would repress either is not moving
toward the highest unfolding of human pow-
ers." Cf. POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW
21 (1951), citing Radbruch whom Dean Pound
had just referred to as the ". . . foremost phi-
losopher of law . . . in the present generation"
as saying there is an irreducible antimony be-
tween justice, morals and security.
13 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1967
human claims and desires with a mini-
mum of friction and waste.9 1 This tells
us not only what law does but also what
it ought to do. 92
Sources of Law
In considering the question of the
sources of law there are two major prob-
lems. First, there is question of the
proximate authoritative sources from
which the existing legal precepts are
drawn. Secondly, there is the issue of
the source of the authority of the law as
such. 93 The second of these poses three
distinct problems: the immediate practical
source, the ultimate practical source, and
the ultimate moral source of the authority
of law.9 4  In dealing with the first prob-
lem the term "source" has been, and still
is, used to mean at least four different
things: the authoritative texts which are
the bases of juristic and doctrinal devel-
opment; the "raw materials" from which
judges derive the grounds for deciding
cases; the formulating agencies by which
rules and principles are shaped; and the
literary shapes in which precepts are
found. This last Pound prefers to call
"form" rather than "source" of law. 95
All of these answer the questions of how
and by whom the content of the precepts
has been worked out, and whence they
l POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 64-
65 (1942).
92Pound, My Philosophy of Law, My Pm-
LOSOPHY OF LAW, CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN
SCHOLARS 252 (1941).
o9 POUND, SOURCES AND FORMS OF LAW 3
(1946).
94 POUND, SOURCES AND FORMS OF LAW 5
(1946); POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW
51 (1942).
!) POUND, op. cit. supra note 93, at 3-5.
RoscOE POUND
derived their content as distinct from
their force and authority. 96
A. Source of Content
Considering the factors to which legal
precepts owe their content, Pound finds
there are six: usage, religion, moral and
philosophical ideas, adjudication, scientific
discussion and legislation. 9
Usage becomes a source of law when
a rule or principle that has been worked
out and formulated by common usage is
given the authority of law by courts or
legislature. The usage of merchants is an
example. 98  Religion, in earlier stages of
legal development, was a principal
source. In modem law, particularly on
the Continent, the influence of the law
of the Church is still evident; 19 moral
and philosophical ideas have their in-
fluence not only in affecting old precepts
but also in shaping, or helping to shape
new ones. This is particularly true in
times when equity and natural law are a
predominant force and there is a tendency
to identify law and morals. 10 Adjudica-
tion gives rise to a tradition of judicial
action as usage gives rise to a tradition
of popular action. In civil law systems,
where legislative precepts rather than
judicial decisions form the starting point
for legal reasoning, a settled course of
decision may be a form rather than a
source of law. In common-law systems
a course of judicial decisions which has
only persuasive authority is a form rather
9C POUND, op. cit. supra note 93, at 5.
07 POUND, op. cit. supra note 93, at 5-9.
98 Ibid.
90 POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW
ch. 2 (1921); cf. Puritanism and the Common
Law, ANN. PROC. KAN. B. ASS'N (1910).
00 POUND, LAW AND MORALS (1924); Law and
Morals, ANN. PROC. W. VA. B. ASS'N (1915).
than a source. But if the decisions are
so well formulated that they are adopted
by a higher court they become authorita-
tive and so are a source of law. 0'
Scientific discussion is a source of law
when the discussions of text writers and
commentators are given formal authority
by being embodied in the decisions and
statutes of courts or legislatures. Doctrinal
writing has been a very important agency
in formulating our law. "While in form
our law is chiefly the work of judges, in
great part judges simply put the guinea
stamp of the state's authority upon pro-
positions which they found worked out
for them in advance. Their creative
work was often a work of intelligent
selection." 102 Finally legislation or direct
formulation of legal precepts by the law-
making organs of the state is an im-
portant source of law. This is a par-
ticularly important source in civil law
jurisdictions, while it is less so in com-
mon-law systems, and, in America, has
made no lasting contribution to law.103
Briefly, the forms or literary shapes in
which the common law of the United
States are found authoritatively expressed
are seven: 1) decisions of old English
courts (before the American Revolution);
2) American judicial decisions, after the
Revolution; 3) judicial decisions of Eng-
lish and other common-law jurisdictions
since the Revolution; 4) the Law Mer-
101 POUND, SOURCES AND FORMS OF LAW 25
(1946).
102 POUND, op. cit. supra note 101, at 7-8; cf.
POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN
LAW 42-43 (1938).
103 POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN
LAW (1938); POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COM-
MON LAW (1921); POUND, AN INTRODUCTION
TO AMERICAN LAW (1920).
chant; 5) the Canon Law of the Church
in some matters such as probate and
divorce; 6) International Law; and 7)
English statutes before the Revolution so
far as they were applicable and received
into the United States law.1
0 4
From the foregoing it is seen that a
developed legal system is made up of two
elements: a customary or traditional ele-
ment, and an imperative or legislative
element. The customary element must
not be thought to derive from a customary
mode of popular action. It is rather a
product of customary modes of profes-
sional or juristic handling of controversies
and is developed by professional writing
and teaching. 05 The imperative element
is that part of the legal system in the
form of rules or standards authoritatively
promulgated by the legislative bodies of
the state prior to judicial decisions, and
usually prior to action.'
One more point remains for brief con-
sideration in connection with the content
of legal precepts. We have just seen the
origin of the precepts. There remain
the modes of growth, or to use Maine's
expression, the "agencies by which law
is brought into harmony with society." 107
The agencies of growth through the tradi-
tional element are eight: fictions, inter-
pretation, equity, natural law, juristic
science, judicial empiricism, comparative
law, and sociological studies. 08 In the
imperative element there are five stages
104POUND, op. cit. supra note 101, at 32; cf.
POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW
(1938).
105 POUND, SOURCES AND FORMS OF LAW 37
(1946).
1oG Id. at 70.
107 Id. at 40.
108 Ibid.
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of development: unconscious legislation,
declaratory legislation, selection and
amendment, conscious constructive legis-
lation, and habitual legislation as an
ordinary agency which often culminates
in codification. 1 9
B. Source of the Authority of Law
The source of the content of legal
precepts could be developed at much
greater length. However, it is a question
of technical nature, of interest primarily
to the jurist and legal historian.110 For
our present purpose the source of the
authority of law is of primary concern.
This problem is not so elaborately devel-
oped by Pound as the former, but it pro-
vides a better clue as to his philosophy. As
already indicated,", this question poses
three distinct problems.
The first problem is that of the im-
mediate practical source of the authority
of the legal order. This is found to be
in the legislative and administrative bodies
of politically organized society and backed
by the force of that society." 2
The second question, that of the
ultimate practical source of authority,
Pound considers to be a question for
political science to solve. However, he
submits, in our political theory we have
come to accept the theory that the source
is consent-the consent of a free people
to be ruled by a government of their own
choosing and by laws which they ap-
prove. 1 13
1091d. at 74-75.
"
0 See POUND, SOURCES AND FORMS OF LAW
(1946).
I" Cf. note 94 supra.
112 Cf. POUND, SOURCES AND FORMS OF LAW
5 (1946); POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH
LAW 51 (1942).
113 POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 52
(1942).
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Turning now to the ultimate moral
source of the authority of law Pound
notes that in the classical juristic theory it
was held that law deduced its authority
directly from justice and derived its bind-
ing force from justice of which it is
declaratory. Today, the dominant legal
philosophy tells us we cannot speak of an
ultimate moral source. But he submits
that the legal order has kept authority
because it performs, and performs well,
the task of social engineering; in other
words, because it works."'
It might well be asked upon what
premises this work of social engineering
is effected, upon what principles we select
and classify, compromise and reconcile
the overlapping and conflicting demands
which press for recognition. We cannot
reconcile conflicting demands except in
the light of some principle of justice, some
idea as to the end of law. Pound tells
us that in the past the process of social
engineering has been governed by ideals
of the end of law and the legal and social
order, and so it should be today.' 15 But,
114 Id. at 53: "The classical juristic theory is
that law may be deduced directly from justice,
from the ideal relation between men, and owes
its binding force to the binding force of
justice which it declares. The dominant legal
philosophy of today tells us that we cannot
answer this question. . . . But the legal
order goes on, whatever may be the basis of
whatever rightful authority it has, and I submit
it has kept and holds authority because it per-
forms, and performs well, its task of reconciling
and harmonizing conflicting and overlapping
human demands and so maintains a social
order in which we may maintain and further
civilization." See also Pound, The Pioneers
and the Common Law, 27 W. VA. L. REV. 1
(1920).
115 POUND, THE THEORY OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS
953 (1923): "In the past it has been governed
and its path defined by ideals of the end of.law
he continues, for our purposes today we
do not have to be guided by any God-
given order laid down once and for all,
nor by any reflection of this divine reason
governing the whole universe." 6 For our
purposes, he continues, and the point is
sufficiently significant to warrant direct
quotation: "If but his precept is other-
wise good social engineering, it is quite
immaterial what are the premises of the
legislative lawmaker or how he develops
them or whether he has any premises at
all." 117
Is it possible that law can achieve its
purpose without principles, that justice
can be really attained by a process of
compromising and reconciling conflicting
claims? If a compromise has been suc-
cessfully effected in a controversy can
we really say that justice has been real-
ized? For Pound the answer must neces-
sarily be affirmative."" The judicial pro-
cess is one not of seeking a reasonable
principle of justice but of a trial and
error method of finding the workable
legal precept."19 The workableness, the
and of the legal and social order, and it is
submitted that such ideals must be our reliance
today and tomorrow."
"'ild. at 954.
117 Id. at 956.
118 Cf. Pound, My Philosophy of Law, My
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, CREDOS OF SIXTEEN
AMERICAN SCHOLARS 252 (1941).
119 POUND, op. cit. supra note 115, at 953:
"Our chief agency of lawmaking is judicial em-
piricism-the judicial search for the workable
legal precept, for the principle which is fruitful
of good results in giving satisfactory grounds
of decision of actual causes, for the legal
conception into which the facts of actual con-
troversies may be fitted with results that accord
with justice between the parties to concrete
litigation. It is a process of trial and error
with all the advantages and disadvantages of
such a process." Cf. POUND, THE FORMATIVE
ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 124 (1938).
functional approach, is always stressed
rather than the intrinsic reasonableness of
legal precepts. Therefore, because the
intrinsic reason and justice of rules do
not give them an unchallengeable author-
ity, he approved the jurists of the last
century who rejected natural law. 2'
Necessarily connected with the ques-
tion of the source of the authority of law
is that of the source of rights and obli-
gations. By reviewing Pound's opinions
as to the source of these rights and obli-
gations we obtain a clearer insight into
his theory of law.
Looking first at the question of rights,
Pound reviews opinions of his predeces-
sors and notes that, in antecedent legal
theories, it was commonly held that rights
were a necessary consequence of human
nature and pertained to man simply be-
cause he is man. They thought of law
as giving effect to these rights simply
because they are natural rights.12 1 Now,
120 POUND, PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 83 (1923): "Yet the jurists of
the last century were right in their judgment
that the classical law-of-nature philosophy could
serve them no longer. They did not perceive
that the facts of political life which it assumed
and interpreted were changing fundamentally.
But they did perceive vividly that its theory
of the source of legal obligation was unsuited
to the times. A theory that found the binding
force of legal rules in the intrinsic reason and
justice of the rules themselves did not put be-
hind its rules the unchallengeable basis of
authority which men have been eager to pro-
vide for the law of the land." CI. 8 ENCYC.
Soc. SCl. 483 (1932).
1218 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 489 (1932): "Where
the nineteenth century thought of law as ex-
isting to give effect to natural rights . ..
jurists since Ihering have thought of recogniz-
ing, delimiting and securing interests. It is
conceived that a legal system attains its end
by recognizing certain interests, by defining
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however, we should speak rather of in-
terests than of rights. These interests are
the demands or desires which human
beings, living in society, seek to satisfy
and of which the legal order must take
account. These interests do not, however,
give rise to an unchallengeable claim
against society, or against other individ-
uals, until they have been defined, de-
limited, and given legal recognition within
the defined limits. They are similar to
what jurists used to call natural rights in
that they are not created by law and
would exist independently of law.
"[M]uch of a kernel of truth . . . was in
the old ideas of a state of nature and in
the theory of natural rights." 122
We can illustrate this shift in emphasis
by one concrete example, the right to
property. Pound sees in the institution
of property not a natural right which is
given effect by legal precept, but a wise
bit of social engineering. Private prop-
erty is a way of satisfying more interests,
more demands and desires with a mini-
mum of friction and waste. 123
the limits within which these interests shall be
recognized legally and given effect through legal
precepts and by endeavoring to secure the
interests so recognized within the defined
limits. For such a theory an interest may be
defined within the defined limits. For such a
theory an interest may be defined as a demand
or desire which human beings, either individu-
ally or in groups, seek to satisfy and of which
therefore the ordering of human relations must
take account .. "
1221bid.; cf. POUND, THE TASK OF LAW 26-30
(1944); POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 41-43 (1922).
123 POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF LAW 234 (1922): "Social-utilitarian
theories explain and justify property as an in-
stitution which secures a maximum of interests
or satisfies a maximum of wants, conceiving it
to be a sound and wise bit of social engineering
Roscoe POUND
Turning next to the root of obligations,
Pound finds this also to be in social in-
terest. Emphasis is no longer on the in-
dividual will but upon the desires and
claims involved in civilized society.12
4
The basis for delictual fault is a jural
postulate of civilized society that men
act with due care 125 and the basis for
delictual liability is the social interest in
the general security. 2  The obligation to
when viewed with reference to its results. This
is the method of Professor Ely's well-known
book on Property and Contract. No one has
yet done so, but I suspect one might combine
this mode of thought with the civilization in-
terpretation of the neo-Hegelians and argue
that the system of individual property, on the
whole, conduces to the maintaining and further-
ing of civilization-to the development of
human powers to the most of which they are
capable-instead of viewing it as a realization
of the idea of civilization as it unfolds in human
experience. Perhaps the theories of the im-
mediate future will run along some such lines.
For we have had no experience of conducting
civilization on any other basis, and the waste
and friction involved in going to any other
basis must give us pause. Moreover, what-
ever we do, we must take account of the in-
stinct of acquisitiveness and of individual claims
grounded thereon. We may believe that the
law of property is a wise bit of social engineer-
ing in the world as we know it, and that we
satisfy more human wants, secure more interests,
with a sacrifice of less thereby than by anything
we are likely to devise-we may believe this
without holding that private property is etern-
ally and absolutely necessary and that human
society may not expect in some civilization,
which we cannot forecast, to achieve something
different and something better." See also POUND,
A SURVEY OF SOCIAL INTERESTS (1943); POUND,
THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 196-98
(1921).
124 POUND, A SURVEY OF SOCIAL INTERESTS
(1943); POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 169 (1922).
125 POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF LAWN 170, 188-90 (1922).
12C Id. at 177.
keep promises or to honor contracts
comes not from the will of the person
who binds himself, but from the social
interest in the security of transactions. 127
It is wise social engineering. If we think
that it is the order of nature it is only
because the habitual application of the
rules of an art come to be taken for
granted.12
8
Evaluation and Critique
In the light of the expos6 just pre-
sented of Pound's legal doctrine, we may
evaluate, both positively and negatively,
his contribution to the advancement of
jurisprudence. Recalling the problems
presented in the first chapter we may well
inquire to what extent he has been suc-
cessful in solving or alleviating those dif-
ficulties. Naturally every solution of such
a problem cannot be attributed to him
directly and individually, but in the de-
velopment of American law during the
last half-century, he has a pre-eminent
role. Even yet he is not satisfied that the
law is perfect, but it must be admitted
that there have been many improvements
since he spoke in St. Paul in 1906.129
127 Id. at 188-90, 237; cf. Pound, Individual In-
terests of Substance-Promised Advantages, 49
HARv. L. REV. 1 (1945).
128 POUND, op. cit. supra note 125, at 278: "Two
circumstances operate to keep the requirements
of consideration alive in our law of simple con-
tract. One is the professional feeling that the
common law is in an idealized form of natural
law and that its actual rules are declaratory of
natural law. This mode of thinking is to be
found in all professions and is a result of
habitual application of the rules of an art until
they are taken for granted."
129We cannot agree with the observation of
Edmond Cahn that Pound appears ". . . so
well satisfied with the law as it now is." See
Cahn, Jurisprudence, ANN. SURVEY AM. L.
1160 (1944). From the time of his first
Pound's main endeavor has been in the
field of legal education. In this domain
alone he has contributed enormously
towards raising the standards required for
the legal profession. Not only has he as-
sisted in improving the basic require-
ments for admission to the legal profes-
sion, but also, by his voluminous reading
and writing, he has helped to create a
widespread interest in legal philosophy.130
If there is a growing interest in natural
law now in America, as there seems to
be,13 ' there can be no doubt but that
Pound helped to foster it. Though not a
strong advocate of natural law himself,
he has been largely responsible for intro-
ducing European ideas of legal philosophy
into America. Realizing that there did
exist a generation of lawyers who studied
law solely in terms of law divorced from
all other social phenomena, he has striv-
en, both in and out of the classroom, to
bring about a closer alliance between law
and the other social sciences."'
Pound's efforts in the field of education
have been productive of some good re-
sults elsewhere. It has helped to over-
come much of the "juristic pessimism"
of which he spoke.133  It has enabled
other lawyers, as well as himself, to adapt
the laws of the country to changed social
and economic circumstances.
Dean Pound has certainly achieved a
major address, note 1 supra, until his book,
Justice According to Law, he has been seeking
and suggesting methods for improving the
law.30 Cf. note 7 supra.
1-3 Cf. Utz, Neue Str6mungen in der Nordam-
erikanischen Rechtsphilosophie, 1949-50 ARCHIV
FUER RECHTS-UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 38.
132 cf. note 30 supra.
133 C. note 18 supra.
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great personal success in winning adher-
ents to his legal theory. He has earned
for himself a host of friends, admirers
and followers nationally and internation-
ally. Yet it cannot be said that his every
effort was positive contribution. Many of
his observations and conclusions merit
critical examination.
A. Historical Critique
Our historical critique is not going to
be prolonged to include every historical
observation, nor is it to be specifically
detailed. However, there are a few points
which need to be corrected. If it is not
too pedantic to bring up such a point, it
should be said, as a general criticism,
that he is guilty of a methodological error
on a grand scale. Time after time he
cites various authors with never a refer-
ence to the locus. The reader is left with-
out an easy opportunity to read the text
in its context. It is extremely difficult, to
the point of impossibility, to check all the
references. In The Spirit of the Common
Law, which he considers his most im-
portant work, Pound cites more than sixty
individual authors, either directly or in-
directly, besides groups of schools of
legal thought, without one reference note.
For this reason we do not know his
source of information when he writes
about Aristotle, but he certainly could not
have been reading Aristotle's text. Pound
calls Aristotle the first of the mechanical
jurists, for he held that the rule of law
was to be applied strictly without regard
for the justice of the individual case.1 3 4
Pound professed a great admiration for
13 C. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 109-10 (1922); POUND,
THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 86 (1921).
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Kohler, yet had he read Kohler correctly
he would have discovered that Kohler
admired Aristotle for just the opposite. 3 '
However, it is not necessary to go to
Kohler for approval of Aristotle. The
text of Aristotle makes it clear that he
looked on the judge as a sort of animate
justice. 136 He considered equity a correc-
tion of the law. 137
Since Pound makes the same com-
ments with regard to St. Thomas Aquinas
as he did of Aristotle, we can turn for
contradictory evidence to Thomas' com-
mentaries on the same text of Aristotle.
According to Pound, St. Thomas con-
ceived the end of law to be one of
putting everybody in his place and keep-
ing him there. 1 38  As to the application
of law in particular case, the Scholastics,
says Pound, ignored the moral aspects of
the case, asking only if the prescribed
legal forms were followed. 13 9 In his com-
mentary on Aristotle, St. Thomas also
tells us plainly that the judge is con-
sidered to be a sort of incarnate justice
in that his mind is totally possessed with
justice.1'40 Likewise he praises equity as
being more excellent in that it observes
the intention of the legislator when his
words are at variance with justice in an
individual case. For the legislator, he
35KOHLER, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 6-7, 86
(1914).
136Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in 5 THE
BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (1941).
13T Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in 5 id. at
1137b10.
13S POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW
86-87, 98 (1921).
39 Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36
HARV. L. REV. 658 (1923).
140 AQUINAS, IN DECEM LIBRos ETHICORUM
ARISTOTELIS AD NICOMACHUM EXPOSITo, bk. V,
lect. 6, No. 955 (Marietti ed. 1934).
says, looks to the plurality of cases, but
is aware that his rule may not fit every
particular case. So the judge, in resort-
ing to equity to attain justice in an
individual case, is doing what the
legislator would do if he were there.1 41
Pound's contention that the Scholastics
conceived of law as a matter of mere
authority can hardly be reconciled with
the definition of St. Thomas. For Pound,
reason came into the law after the
Reformation. 141  St. Thomas defines law
as essentially an act of reason.143  As
to its end, law is ordered to the common
good 14 and not to putting everybody in
his place by force and keeping him there.
The common good includes the ultimate
happiness of all the members.
Dean Pound appears to have been too
easily convinced by a popular Renaissance
notion that the middle ages were dark
ages. Had he investigated the Scholastic
writers more carefully, rather than taking
the word of a secondary source, he
could not possibly have come to the
conclusions he did. In helping to per-
petuate a story that is no longer believed
by prudent historians, he has rendered
a disservice to scholarship in general as
well as to jurisprudence. It is unbeliev-
able that a man of Pound's intellectual
ability could commit so gross an error
if the doctrine of St. Thomas on law had
ever once been presented to him ob-
jectively.
Turning to contemporary scholars we
'41 AQUINAS, op. cit. supra note 140, lect. 16.
142Pound, A Comparison of Ideals of Law,
47 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1933).
143 AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-I, q. 90, art.
1.
144 Id. at I-I, q. 90, art. 2.
find that Dean Pound takes suitable
phrases or ideas out of context and uses
them to his own advantage. It has
already been noted that from Kohler he
takes thee jural postulates by a scissors-
and-paste method while rejecting the
principles upon which they were con-
ceived by Kohler.' 4 5
In a like manner, Pound claims to take
his scheme of social interests from
Ihering. For Ihering an interest presup-
poses a right and the interest is artificially
stimulated, if necessary, in order to main-
tain rights. For Pound, on the contrary,
there are only interests which the law
may or may not recognize. Private
property for example, is considered by
Pound to be a wise bit of social engineer-
ing, a way of securing more interests. For
Ihering, property is a part of personality
extended to things.'1 46  To speak of
property in terms of interest is, for him,
a degeneration of the proper sense of
property and a denial of its natural
basis. ' 7  In short, if one's knowledge of
Ihering were limited to what can be
gained from Pound it would be very
inexact. In effect he has taken from
Ihering only the terminology of "interests"
and given it an altogether different mean-
ing.
Another case in point is G~ny. Where
he speaks of science and technique as
necessary to law, Pound takes only the
elements of technique as though that were
all that was mentioned by Gfny. Grny
is the foremost natural-law legal scholar
in France, and it would be an injustice
145 POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY
150 (1923).
146 IHERING, DER KAMPF 40.
247 Ibid.
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to him to intimate that he extolls tech-
nique over science in law. But there is
nothing to be gained by multiplication of
examples. This method of citation is
destined only to deceive. The use of con-
venient texts does not in any considerable
extent change the essential pragmatism of
Pound's legal theory.
B. Philosophical Critique
A philosophical critique of Pound's
legal theory is much more difficult since
there is very little of philosophy to be
found therein. This is not intended as
a harsh criticism since he makes no great
pretense at philosophy and very aptly
refers to his theory as sociological juris-
prudence. Nevertheless there are funda-
mental presuppositions, the lack of
which is itself a matter of investigation
in legal theory.
With Pound the difficulty is made
greater by reason of his extraordinarily
loose use of language and distrust of, or
disrespect for, logic. One well known
American professor of law was almost
driven to despair when he could not un-
derstand the legal Realists. But he felt
relieved to learn that Pound could not
understand them, nor could they under-
stand him.148 The fact is, he rarely makes
a statement of consequence without sur-
rounding it with so many qualifying and
conditional phrases that one wonders at
the end if he is speaking or quoting.
However, even with the lack of logic and
loose language a few notions do emerge
distinctly.
Definition of Law: It has already
been noted that Pound gives various
148Lucey, Natural Law and American Legal
Realism, 30 GEO. L.J. 493-94 (1942).
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descriptions of law but never arrives at
a precise definition. 149  Each of the
descriptions reveals something of his
philosophy of law but no one of them,
nor even all of them taken together,
gives a clear notion of what he means
by law. Nevertheless, by considering not
only the descriptions of law which he
gives, but also the various meanings of
law which he criticizes, one can gain a
clearer concept of what he himself under-
stands by law.
Thus Pound criticizes the ancient jurists
because they considered the purpose of
law to be the maintenance of peace. It
is, therefore, clear that for Pound law
is not an instrument for securing and
maintaining peace in society.
Likewise he criticizes Aristotle and the
scholastics for holding that the end of
law is the maintenance of the status quo.
The historical dubiety of this point has
already been indicated. But from his
criticism of this alleged purpose it is
clear that for Pound the end of law is
not the preservation of the existing order
in society.
On the other hand, he says, using
Ihering's system of social interests, law
is not in the person but in society. It
is clear that, for Pound, law and rights
are not in the person. In each person
there are only interests which he seeks
to have recognized. Only when the
interests are recognized can we speak of
rights. Each individual seeks his own
proper good by pressing for the recog-
nition of his interests.
Likewise Pound takes from Gcny the
element of technique. It has already
49 See text at note 39 supra.
been pointed out that for Geny the ele-
ment of technique is always secondary to
the science and is at the service of
science to realize the ends which the
science of law proposes. But, as inter-
preted by Pound, the technique of G~ny
becomes a means of attaining an order
of peace among those who seek to
satisfy their own interests.
Taking the various descriptions which
he gives, and the criticisms of other
jurists, we see that, for Pound, law is a
compromise imposed by authority in a
society where each one seeks his own
interests. This definition, however, has
special qualities. It is not a pure
positivist definition as, for example, we
find in Kelsen. For Kelsen there is no
recognition of personality but only pure
law. For him the notion of law is derived
purely from law as such, abstracting from
any concept of personality or of any
given society of persons. For Lauter-
pacht also, law is defined as an instru-
ment of order in a society with no con-
sideration of the persons in the society or
of the determined structure of the so-
ciety. Del Vecchio also gives a definition
of law in which he envisages a deter-
mined society but abstracts from the in-
ternal structure of the society.
For Pound, on the other hand, there is
always a real element since he sees law
as an instrument in a free society, a
society in which he takes into consider-
ation the liberty of all who seek their per-
sonal development. For this reason he
is certainly not a positivist in the sense
of Kelsen. We recognize here a realiza-
tion of a demand of natural law, that
is, that the definition of law must imply
the real human nature, or a society of
free men. Unfortunately, however, with
Pound it is not human nature as
universally given.
Despite this approach to natural law,
there is in his conception of law an
element far removed from natural law,
properly speaking. From Ihering he
takes the notion of interests and develops
it as though there were no rights in the
person but only interests which struggle
for recognition. It is thus clear that for
Pound rights and law exist only in so-
ciety and not in persons. Parenthetically,
it might be said that there is a sense in
which this is correct, for if there were
only one person in the world there would
be no law. Law formally exists as a
relation among several free, moral sub-
jects. Nevertheless, what exists before
this formal law is more than a personal
interest only. There is a real law realized
in the same nature of the several subjects,
as we shall explain in more detail later.
Dean Pound believes law is an instru-
ment of organization in a concrete
political society where each seeks his own
interests. But according to natural law
one can well imagine that, before the
state, there is a society founded upon
human nature as such. While it is true
that in one sense society has a primacy
over the individual, it is also true that
man exists before the actual creation of
the state, and carries his personal rights
into the state which he founds. The
rights of the individual are not creations
of the state, but, as Pound remarks re-
garding interests, they exist in the person
independently of any state. Certainly, law
always exists in any social organization.
But this social organization precedes
positive legislation, being included in the
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social, not only individual, nature of man.
For this reason it is clear that Pound
does not take all of human reality into
consideration, although he does not ab-
stract completely from human personality
as do some other jurists. But since he
does not consider all of human reality he
remains outside the natural-law concept
of law and closer to the positivist
definition.
Finality: Considering finality as it is
found in law, Pound approaches the
idealists and also, to a certain extent, the
natural-law jurists. A philosophy of
pure law, such as advocated by Kelsen
for example, eliminates all finality and
considers only the operation of pure
positive law. Pound, on the contrary,
introduces the notion of finality into his
conception of law.
However, the notion of finality with
which Pound is concerned tends to con-
fuse juridical politics and the finality of
law itself. What he is really concerned
with is the finality as found in juridical
politics. In this sense all idealists, such
as Stammler and Del Vecchio, admit a
finality. But juridical politics is not law;
it does not establish a juridical order. It
is rather the antecedent effort to estab-
lish a juridical order. In the juridical
order itself Pound does not admit of a
finality but rather of a conflict of com-
peting interests which seek for recognition.
The order which he imposes is not, there-
fore, a juridical order.
In the theory of natural law, on the
other hand, man with all his rights is
social. And we must consider the com-
plete nature of man as a member of a
social community with a task to perform,
not merely as he is known by social
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psychology as an intelligent being who
has interests he wishes to satisfy.
Finality, as understood by natural law, is
imposed by the very nature of man as a
social being who must by nature seek
the common good. This finality is itself
juridical and not merely ethical in the
modern sense of individual ethics, and it
creates law by itself prior to and inde-
pendently of positive legislation.
Some might object that this theory-
that a determined finality is the first
principle of the legal order-creates law,
and favors dictatorship in the formation
of law, as for example Nazism. With
Pound's theory, they would add, this
danger is absent because there is no pre-
determined finality but only juridical
politics in a determined society.
To this objection we reply that it is
clear that juridical finality could be
abused and made to serve the end of
totalitarianism. To avoid this danger we
must create barriers and also have re-
course to a certain individualism. This
individualist principle of order is found
in natural law and as a juridical principle.
Natural law does not say that any finality
is juridical. If that were the case, then
it would be true that the objectives pro-
posed for itself by any determined political
regime would have the power to create
law. But only that finality which cor-
responds to human nature has the power
to create law. Therefore the principle
cannot serve the ends of any form of
totalitarianism. On the contrary, it. is
the surest protection against absolutism
since it insists that finality as found in
human nature not only creates law but
also renders morally and juridically void
any positive legislation contrary to that
finality. In Pound's theory, on the other
hand, this protection is absent because
there are no rights in the person but only
interests which are recognized by political
authority. It follows, if there are no
higher norms, that the authority which
granted recognition to certain interests
could likewise withdraw that recognition.
With our conception of finality we can
resolve questions of law where there is
no positive determination. For Pound,
on the other hand, these questions can
only be resolved by a compromise of con-
flicting interests. If understood properly
his principle is not entirely false because
interests, in so far as they are conformed
to human nature, are a principle of order.
But experience demonstrates that not
every interest which men seek to secure
is conformed to human nature. Because
interests which are in conformity with
human nature are a principle of order,
Christian theory of natural law has
always supported the principle of sub-
sidiarity as a juridical principle. Accord-
ing to this principle, individuals seek to
satisfy their own interests in an order
which is conformed to nature and which
seeks first the common good. This can-
not be identified with Pound's theory of
interests, which are not and cannot be
juridical principles.
Norms: The most important part of
Pound's philosophy of law gives occasion
to a discussion of his conception of norms.
Actually he has no juridical norms in the
strict sense. What he admits as similar
to norms are the interests of the citizens
organized in a political society. Peace
and order are to be realized in this so-
ciety, not according to any superior
norms, but only according to the different
wills.
To be sure, there is some rule, some
norm, i.e., freedom. But this freedom has
no determined content. The content, the
manner, of this freedom is in continuous
evolution, depending on the decision of
the citizen. The concept of freedom as a
rule is, therefore, similar to a categorical
concept of Kant, without any determin-
ation. Nevertheless we have to recog-
nize that Pound, by underlining individual
freedom, is in no way in agreement with
the neo-Kantian, Kelsen, for whom there
is nothing determined by the concept of
law. For Kelsen, Russian law would be
law in the same way as American law.
Pound's doctrine of freedom, on the con-
trary, determines the concept of law in a
restricted sense, though he does not admit
any determination for this freedom.
Here the doctrine of natural law pro-
ceeds by determining the freedom of man
according to a really strict norm, that of
human nature. And in this manner we
come to an ethical concept of norms,
that is, a norm imposed as an ideal for
everyone. For human nature is not only
a norm for the individual man; it is the
same for all of humanity. Thus human
nature becomes a principle for organizing
every human society.
But this doctrine of natural law as an
ethical norm of society provokes a delicate
question, i.e., whether this norm must be
rigorously and rigidly applied to society.
The difficulty is evident. When we have
to apply ethical norms to society in the
same way as to the individual man, there
is no more freedom for each man in the
sense that his own discretion and
arbitrariness be the norm of social organ-
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ization and social engineering. There, only
the objective truth, which is imposed on
everybody, is a norm. Here, one could
speak of a dogmatic function of law,
settled by an authority like divine
authority. But where is this infallible
authority? Contemporary society no
longer acknowledges such an authority as
it was in medieval times when Christian
faith was the foundation of all social
action. Modem society has no common
conscience. On the contrary, human con-
science has disintegrated to the point
where there are as many consciences as
there are human beings.
For this reason we are forced to regu-
late social order according to the prin-
ciple of individual freedom. Otherwise
there would be no order. Or should we.,
perhaps, regulate it according to author-
itarianism? This is excluded by reason
of the fact that no human authority can
guarantee to conduct human society in a
really objective sense. Therefore author-
itarianism must always remain a social or
political system opposed to ethical norms.
We come, apparently, to the same con-
clusion proposed by Pound: individual
freedom is the rule for social engineering.
That much is certainly true. But there
is a great difference. Our conclusion is
really a conclusion, that is an application
of ethical principles. According to our
principle there is not simply individual
freedom but freedom absolutely subjected
to objective truth. Only in the applica-
tion can we agree that individual freedom
can be recognized as a rule of order. 50
And even in this we can never abandon
150 Cf. UTz, RECHT UND GERECHLIGKEIT 564-71
(1953).
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the ethical demand that the juridical
order, in so far as it is possible, must con-
stantly seek the absolute truth. Accord-
ing to the doctrine of natural law, there
exists in every man a certain general
knowledge of ethical demands. It is for
this reason, for example, that after
World War II it was possible to punish
war criminals.
It appears that Pound supposes this
general knowledge of ethical demands in
saying that apart from freedom there is
another norm, i.e., "civilization." How-
ever, it is not clear what he means by
this term. Like freedom, this concept of
civilizaton is, with Pound, evolutionary
and devoid of any determined content.
Nevertheless, this conception seems to
approach the above mentioned idea of a
general knowledge of ethical demands.
However, this is an interpretation which
may not have been Pound's when he
speaks of civilization. Because the term
as used by him is vague and used to de-
nominate a future possible, it cannot
serve as a juridical norm. To summarize,
Pound attempts to build a juridical sys-
tem without any juridical norms.
Conclusion
We have seen briefly, but in its essential
elements, the legal philosophy of Roscoe
Pound. For him, law is a process of
social engineering, a process of adjusting
and compromising conflicting claims so
that the maximum of human interest may
be satisfied with a minimum of friction
and waste. The philosophical foundations
of Pound's legal theory is essentially
pragmatism; law is defined in terms of
function. Natural law and philosophy
are admitted as supplying ideal norms
which may be used as a critique of
existing law or to formulate positive
laws, but they are not admitted as juridi-
cal norms. Natural law, in the Thomistic
sense, is rejected chiefly because it is not
known. When Pound speaks of natural
law he is referring to later concepts of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Pound's legal theory is radically de-
ficient because he attempts to create a
legal order without juridical norms.
Although he speaks frequently of absolute
norms of justice, in reality he does not
admit of such norms or he confuses them
with social or cultural norms. As is
evident from his use of the jural postu-
lates, the law should be designed to meet
the reasonable expectations of the society
of the time and place. The law then is,
for him, an instrument for ordering social
life in a determinate society, something
which is wholly foreign to the absolute
norms of natural law of which St. Thomas
speaks. Pound speaks of morality in the
law, but on these principles it could be
only a morality born of the social con-
science of the time and place. A Thom-
ist could not admit such a norm of
morality. For a Thomist human nature
is the principle not only of individual
ethics but also of social ethics, of which
legal philosophy forms a part. The legal
order must, therefore, enforce a moral
conduct which is objective and not born
of a particular social or cultural con-
science.
In practice, however, it is extremely
difficult to change an established legal
system and theory. If the norm for
jurisprudence is to be the individual will,
then the task that faces the scholastic
legal scholar is one of juridical politics.
The individual conscience must be so
formed that what each one wills cor-
responds with what he should will. The
principle that the individual will pro-
vides the ultimate norm for a legal sys-
tem can provide the basis for a stable
social and legal order only when the in-
dividual will is perfectly subjected to the
objective norms deriving from human na-
ture. Admittedly it would be difficult to
the point of impossibility to form the
conscience of all so that they corresponded
exactly with objective norms of human
action. But if a majority, or even a
large number, of the citizens were so
formed then their desires would be re-
flected in laws more in conformity with
the demands of natural law.
In the practical order, one of Pound's
constant concerns has been to avoid any
form of absolutism in government. To
this end he insists that we must have
absolute norms of values. If the ideals
are absolute, he says, it puts something
above the ruler or ruling body, something
by which to judge them and by which
they are held to rule. Yet it is impossible
for Pound himself to have absolute
ideals of justice. Based as it is on a
theory of social interests, his measure of
values must necessarily be relative and
also must necessarily be constantly
changing and adjusting to the needs of
the time and place. Further, since this
theory of interest admits of no absolute
rights but only interests that have been
recognized by the political force of the
society, it follows that the political force
that granted the recognition can like-
wise withdraw its recognition. Thus the
individual is left without any rights that
owe their existence to his nature. The
interests of the individual are enforceable
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only if and to the extent that they are
recognized by the political force of the so-
ciety. It is evident, therefore, that the
very thing that Pound is most anxious to
avoid is rendered more easily possible and
the door is left open to absolutism in
government. Only when there is recog-
nition of rights based on human nature is
freedom guaranteed.
Besides the juridical politics mentioned
above there is yet another way that
scholastic philosophers and legal scholars
can exercise an influence in the accepted
schools of jurisprudence. It has been
seen that Pound draws his materials from
the most diverse sources. Although this
does not alter his fundamental pragma-
tism, it does offer an opportunity to
modem scholastics to exercise an in-
fluence even within the framework of
pragmatic legal theory. At the present
time there is in America a decided dis-
satisfaction with the reigning legal theory.
Jurists, and Pound among the first, are
calling for legal philosophy to direct the
new movement. In the past jurists have
rejected natural-law theories because they
have been confronted with pseudo
theories. The task for scholastics is to
present the authentic natural law and
allow it to be judged on its own merits.
Another strong movement which can
be noticed among American jurists is a
sentiment for codification of the law.
If such a move should come, it would
not necessarily destroy the common-
law technique, but it would give
a greater stability to the law. Modern
scholastics must be prepared to present
the traditional Thomistic doctrine of law.
The time is ripe and the sentiment is
well disposed for it to be received into
the law.
